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CASENOTE

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Presidential Immunity-The
President Is Absolutely Immune From Civil Damages Liability
For Acts Done Within The "Outer Perimeter" Of His Official
Capacity.
Nixon v. Fitzgerald,
-

U.S.

-,

102 S. Ct. 2690, 73 L. Ed. 2d 349 (1982).

In 1970, A. Ernest Fitzgerald's job as a management analyst with the
Department of the Air Force was eliminated as a result of a departmental
reorganization.' When he was not reassigned to another federal position,'
Fitzgerald filed a complaint with the Civil Service Commission alleging
that his removal constituted retaliation for his testimony before a congressional committee in which he divulged large cost-overruns and other
difficulties with a Department of Defense project.3 The Commission disagreed with Fitzgerald's allegations 4 but held that his removal was a violation of certain civil service regulations,' recommended that he be reinstated or reassigned, and ordered payment of lost compensation.8 After
1. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, - U.S ....
102 S. Ct. 2690, 2693, 73 L. Ed. 2d 349, 353
(1982).
2. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2695, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 355. President Nixon asked White
House Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman to have Fitzgerald reassigned to another position in
the administration after public hearings were convened by the Subcommittee on Economy
in Government regarding Fitzerald's dismissal and after the press had queried the President
about the situation. Id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2694 n.1, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 354. There was strong
resistance, however, to the reassignment within the administration, particularly by White
House aide Alexander Butterfield, who circulated a memo stating that Fitzgerald was disloyal and recommending that "we should let him bleed for awhile at least." Id. at -, 102 S.
Ct. at 2694-95, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 354-55.
3. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2694-95, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 354-55. It was not disputed that
Fitzgerald's testimony humiliated and angered Department of Defense officials. See id. at
102 S. Ct. at 2694 n.1, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 354 n.1.
4. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2696, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 356-57.
5. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2695-96, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 356. The examiner held that 5
C.F.R. § 752 barred the use of a "reduction in force" to move Fitzgerald "for reasons purely
personal to him." Id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2696 n.16, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 356 n.16.
6. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2696 n.17, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 356 n.17. Prior to rendering its
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this decision, Fitzgerald filed a suit for damages in the United States District Court.' President Nixon, however, was not named as a defendant
until 1978 in a second amended complaint.8 The district court denied a
motion for summary judgment' and rejected Nixon's claim of "absolute
presidential immunity." 10 Nixon pursued a collateral appeal in the court
of appeals which was summarily dismissed for lack of jurisdiction." The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the scope of
presidential immunity."2 Held-Reversed and remanded. The President

final decision of September 18, 1973, the Commission conducted public hearings which attracted fervent publicity primarily due to Air Force Secretary Robert Seaman's testimony.
Id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2695, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 355. Although the Secretary refused to be
specific, he did testify that the White House had given him "some advice" before Fitzgerald's position was eliminated. When asked about the Secretary's testimony at a news conference, President Nixon stated that he had approved Fitzgerald's removal. Id. at -, 102 S.
Ct. at 2695, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 355. Hours after the conference Nixon privately told presidential
aide Charles Colson that he had ordered the firing. Id. at -, 102 S.Ct. at 2695 n.13, 73 L.
Ed. 2d at 355 n.13. The next day, however, the White House retracted the President's statement and asserted that Nixon had not approved the dismissal. See id. at -, 102 S.Ct. at
2695, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 356.
7. See id. at -, 102 S.Ct. at 2696, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 357. The suit, which raised claims
similar to those alleged in the complaint filed with the Civil Service Commission, named
eight Defense Department officials, White House aide Alexander Butterfield, and other unnamed aides as defendants. Id. at -, 102 S.Ct. at 2696, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 357.
8. See id. at -, 102 S.Ct. at 2697, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 357. The district court dismissed
the original complaint holding that it was barred by a three-year statute of limitations. See
Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688, 698 (D.D.C. 1974), modified, 553 F.2d 220 (D.C.
Cir. 1977). The appellate court affirmed except as to Butterfield since his involvement was
unknown until after the memo he circulated in 1973. See Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 553 F.2d
220, 229, 231 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Following remand by the appellate court, Fitzgerald filed the
second amended complaint. Although this complaint also named several other officials, by
March 1980 only Richard Nixon and White House aides Bryce Harlow and Alexander Butterfield remained. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald,

-

U.S.

--

102 S. Ct. 2690, 2697, 73 L. Ed.

2d 349, 357 (1982).
9. See id. at -, 102 S.Ct. at 2697, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 357. The Court ruled that Fitzgerald had triable causes of action under 5 U.S.C. § 7211 (Supp. III 1979) which provides that
an employee's right to testify before a House Committee cannot be obstructed, and 18
U.S.C. § 1505 (Supp. V 1981), which makes obstructions of congressional testimony a crime.
See id. at -, 102 S.Ct. at 2697 n.20, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 357 n.20 (1982). The district court also
ruled that Fitzgerald had a cause of action under the first amendment. See id. at -, 102
S.Ct. at 2697, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 357.
10. Id,at -, 102 S.Ct. at 2697, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 358.
11. See id. at -, 102 S.Ct. at 2697-98, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 358.
12. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 452 U.S. 959 (1981). The United States Supreme Court did
affirm, by an equally divided court with Justice Rehnquist not participating, a part of a
court of appeals decision which rejected presidential immunity. See Halperin v. Kissinger,
606 F.2d 1192, 1212 (D.C. Cir. 1979), af'd in part and dismissed in part, 452 U.S. 713
(1981) (Court affirmed regarding Nixon, Kissinger, and Mitchell, and dismissed regarding
Haldeman). The instant case represents the first time the Supreme Court has directly ad-
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is absolutely immune from civil damages liability for acts done within the
"outer perimeter" of his official capacity."

The concept of immunity for various government officials emanates
from common law, the Federal Constitution, and case law.1 4 From common law, judges have acquired absolute immunity from civil suits based
on their official acts regardless of malicious motives or a clear absence of
actual jurisdiction."0 The rule is designed to protect the public interest"

and to maintain the independence of the judiciary. 17 For the same reasons, absolute immunity has been extended to quasi-judicial officials such

as grand and petit jurors s and prosecutors.1 9 Whereas judges have acquired their immunity from the common law, federal legislators have a
constitutional basis for absolute immunity from civil damages in the

Speech or Debate Clause.20 The clause has been broadly construed to pro-

dressed the issue.
13. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald,

-

U.S ....

102 S. Ct. 2690, 2705, 73 L. Ed. 2d 349,

367 (1982).
14. See, e.g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 373, 376 (1951) (immunity of state
legislators held co-extensive with that of federal legislators); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103
U.S. 168, 201-04 (1880) (Speech or Debate Clause in Constitution reflects parliamentary
privilege); Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 536 (1868) (immunity for judges recognized for centuries in England).
15. See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 350-51 (1871). The immunity prevails
as long as there is "potential" jurisdiction. Only when a judge is clearly without jurisdiction
over the subject matter does the immunity dissolve. See id. at 350-51.
16. See Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 495 (1896) (public interest served by independent judiciary acting without fear of retribution).
17. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 (1978) (immunity required to insure
judges can function "without harassment or intimidation"); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.
349, 363 (1978) (judge should be free to act on own convictions without fear of consequences); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (judge should not have to fear retribution
from "unsatisfied litigants"); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1871) (liability
to aggrieved litigants would destroy independence of judiciary without which it is neither
respectable nor useful). For a frequently cited list of nine reasons which justify absolute
judicial immunity, see Jennings, Tort Liability Of Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. REv.
263, 271-72 (1937).
18. See Engdahl, Immunity And Accountability For Positive Governmental Wrongs,
44 U. CoLo. L. Rxv. 1, 46 (1972). Immunity has been considered imperative for several participants in judicial proceedings. See Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 496 (1896). "No judge,
no jury, nor witness,. . . 'could discharge his duty freely if not protected by a positive rule
of law from being harassed by actions in respect of the mode in which he did the duty
imposed upon him. ....'" Id. at 496 (citation omitted).

19. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422-25 (1976); Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396,
402 (2d Cir. 1926), aff'd per curiam, 275 U.S. 503 (1927). Again, the immunity for these
officials only extends to their official acts. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 (1976).
20. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. The Speech or Debate Clause provides: "[Senators
and Representatives] shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be
privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses,
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tect Congress from unwarranted interference in the execution of its functions. " In extending the immunity to state legislators, the Supreme Court
stressed that "[l]egislators are immune . . . not for their private indul'2 2
gence but for the public good.

While protecting the public good is considered one attribute of the
Speech or Debate Clause,23 its primary purpose was to incorporate the
doctrine of separation of powers into the Constitution.24 Heavily influenced by the views of Montesquieu, 25 the Framers viewed separation of
powers as an indelible means of preventing a resurgence of the tyranny
they had once fled;26 thus, the legislative, judicial, and executive powers
were vested in three separate branches of the government.27 Each branch
is to be "largely separate from one another," ' s yet it was recognized early
that some degree of interdependence is necessary to insure that "ambi-

and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House,
they shall not be questioned in any other Place." Id. § 6, cl. 1.
21. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 618 (1972); Levi, Some Aspects Of Separation Of Powers, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 371, 383 (1976). The clause has been construed to
provide two different privileges. First, it protects members of Congress from civil arrest
while attending or traveling to and from Congress; however, this protection does not render
members immune from criminal arrest or civil process. Second, legislators are absolutely
immune from civil or criminal suit and arrest or process with respect to legislative acts. See
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 614-16 (1972).
22. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951).
23. See id. at 377.
24. See, e.g., Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616 (1972) (clause designed to assure freedom of coequal branch); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 182 (1966) (primary thrust of clause is separation of powers); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378
(1951) (courts should not interfere with legislative committee's investigation absent clear
usurpation of judicial or executive functions).
25. See Sharp, The Classical American Doctrine of "The SeparationOf Powers," 2 U.
CHI. L. REV. 385, 419 (1935). Montesquieu espoused his theory of separation of powers in
The Spirit of the Laws. See MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (D. Carrithers ed.
1977). Montesquieu has been referred to as the "high priest of separation of powers." R.
BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 3 (1974).
26. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120-21 (1976); Sharp, The Classical American
Doctrine of "The Separation of Powers," 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 385, 385 (1935). Madison advocated Montesquieu's maxim in the Federalist Papers: " 'When the legislative and executive
powers are united in the same person or body,' says he, 'there can be no liberty .... .' " THE
FEDERALIST No. 47 (J. Madison), quoted in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120 (1976).
27. See U.S. CONsT. arts. I-III.
28. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120 (1976); accord Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S.
168, 190-91 (1880) (each branch limited "by the law of its creation" to powers appropriate to
it); see also Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30
STAN. L. REV. 661, 689 (1978). The author refers to the three branch independence as the
"hydraulic model" in which "[t]he fluid nature and scope of each branch's functions expand
to fit circumstances until they reach the limit set by a competing branch's function." Id. at
689.
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tion [could] be made to counter-act ambition." 9 Although the principle
of separation of powers counseled a form of government which has existed for over two hundred years, it has not assumed the status of a settled rule or an infallible formula.30 Consequently, theories concerning its
application have varied."1 The Supreme Court itself has admitted that
separation of powers questions are not resolved according to fixed legal
rules, but "according to common sense and the inherent necessities of the
'
governmental co-ordination." 32
Recently, however, the Court has adhered
to a balancing analysis which requires determining the extent to which
the act of one branch prevents another "from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions." s

In Halperin v. Kissinger,3 4 a federal court of appeals determined that
separation of powers does not dictate that the President receive absolute
immunity from civil damages suits.8 5 The court concluded that there is no
basis for distinguishing between the President and other high executive
officials" who were given only qualified immunity in a 1979 case, Butz v.

Economou

7

The qualified immunity test, which was first applied to state

29. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 344 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). Madison believed
that "blending" was essential for the efficient operation of government. See Sharp, The
Classical American Doctrine Of "The Separation of Powers," 2 U. CHI. L. REv. 385, 407
(1935). "Blending" is synonomous with the principle of checks and balances which the
Framers also injected into the Constitution. See Note, PresidentialImmunity From Constitutional Damage Liability, 60 B.U.L. REv. 879, 900-01 (1980). See generally M. VILE, CONsTITIMONALiSM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 13-18 (1967).
30. See Larnaude, Separation of Powers, in 7 CONGRESS OF ART AND SCIENCE 613
(1904), quoted in Frankfurter and Landis, Power Of Congress Over ProcedureIn Criminal
Contempts In "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study In Separation Of Powers, 37 HARv. L.
REv. 1010, 1014 (1924).

31. Compare Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (extent of presidential powers fluctuates "depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress") with Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117
(1926) (if presidential function is "essential," no other branch may intrude). For a review
and criticism of the different methods the Court has employed in analyzing separation of
powers questions, see Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable
Remedies, 30 STAN. L. RFv. 661, 688-97 (1978).
32. J.W. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928).
33. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977); accord United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711-12 (1974).
34. 606 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1979), aff'd in part and dismissed in part, 452 U.S. 713
(1981) (court affirmed regarding Nixon, Kissinger, and Mitchell and dismissed regarding
Haldeman).
35. See id. at 1211-12.
36. See id. at 1210-11.
37. 438 U.S. 478 (1978). In another recent Supreme Court case, senior aides and advisors of the President were accorded qualified, rather than absolute, immunity. See Harlow
v. Fitzgerald,

-

U.S.

-,

-,

102 S.Ct. 2727, 2734, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396, 405 (1982).
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officials, 88 involves both an objective and subjective standard of good
faith.8 ' The objective standard requires a finding that the actor violated a
constitutional right of which he knew or should have known.' 0 Under the
subjective standard, liability is imposed when an official acts with "the
malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other
injury to the [plaintiff].' 1 If either the subjective or objective test is satisfied, the official's immunity is defeated.4 2 The scope of qualified immunity, however, will vary depending on the range of discretion and responsibilities incumbent on the office.'"
Although executive immunity has been recognized since 1845, 44 in Butz
the Supreme Court concluded that two of the leading cases on the sub-

38. See, e.g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 561 (1978) (prison administrators
adequately protected by qualified immunity); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321-22
(1975) (school administrator entitled to qualified immunity); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232, 242, 247 (1974) (governor and other state official given qualified immunity). All of these
cases involved actions brought under 42 U.S.C. §. 1983, which permits individuals to sue
state officials when they are deprived of their constitutional rights under color of state law.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
39. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 318 (1975); Note, PresidentialImmunity
from ConstitutionalDamages Liability, 60 B.U.L. REv. 879, 887 (1980).
40. See, e.g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 562 (1978) (qualified immunity unavailable to prison official if knew or should have known constitutional rights infringed);
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 577 (1975) (hospital superintendent not entitled to
immunity if knew or should have known about violation of mental patient's constitutional
rights); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975) (school board member not immune if
knew or should have known student's constitutional rights violated).
41. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975). The Supreme Court has adopted the
definition of intent found in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A (1965) which contemplates that an actor intends the natural consequences of his acts. See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 566 (1978).
42. See Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1979), aff'd in part and
dismissed in part, 452 U.S. 713 (1981).
43. See Scheurer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974).
44. See Kendall v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 87, 98 (1845) (United States Postmaster
General not liable in damages for erroneous exercise in judgment); Developments In The
Law-Remedies Against The United States And Its Officials, 70 HAIv. L. REv. 827, 834
(1957). But see Engdahl, Immunity And Accountability For Positive Governmental
Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REv. 1, 48 (1972). The author recognizes that Kendall has been
relied upon in modern opinions as establishing immunity for executive officials charged with
discretion but contends that the case is not supportive of such a rule. See id. at 48. Engdahl
suggests that absolute immunity would be inconsistent with the principles Justice Story
pronounced at that time in his Commentaries on Agency and with early nineteenth century
cases. All of these authorities held that not only must there have been actual authority for
the act, but there is also no immunity when an official exceeds the bounds of his authority
or when a positive tort results. The author does, however, point out that Justice Story
joined the opinion in Kendall and that there was a pro-immunity shift in Supreme Court
decisions after the Civil War. See id. at 21, 41, 48.
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ject, Spalding v. Vilas 4" and Barr v. Matteo,"4 were not controlling.4 7
Spalding held that the Postmaster General was absolutely immune from
damages liability based on acts which had "more or less connection with"
matters within his authority. 4 In Barr, an acting director of an executive
agency was accorded absolute immunity from a defamation suit based on
an act which was within the "outer perimeter" of his authority.4s The
majority in Butz distinguished these cases on the ground that while they
involved common law causes of action, the case before them involved a
constitutional cause of action.5 0
Halperin also involved a constitutional cause of action; 1 therefore, the
appellate court turned to both the Constitution and the commentary of

45. 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
46. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
47. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 493-95 (1978).
48. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896). In that case the Postmaster General of
the United States circulated a memo informing post office personnel that an act of Congress
had provided for salary adjustments in which no attorneys' fees were necessary. The plaintiff, the attorney who represented claimants under the act, alleged that the circular was
intended to deceive his clients and thereby deprive him of fees; the attorney also sought
damages for defamation of character. See id. at 487-98. In affirming a judgment for the
defendant, the Supreme Court drew heavily upon judicial immunity cases and opined that
"the same general considerations of public policy and convenience" which require immunity
from civil suits for damages arising from acts done in the course of official actions applies to
heads of executive departments. Id. at 498.
49. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 (1959). In Barr, a press release was circulated
which announced the agency director's intention to suspend respondents for supporting a
plan which contravened agency policy. See id. at 565-66. The Court held that in light of the
broad discretion vested in the director, it would be overly restrictive to hold that the statement was not released in the line of duty. See id. at 575.
50. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 489, 493-95 (1978). The constitutional cause of
action was established in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Bivens provided that a citizen who suffers a compensable injury
to a constitutionally protected interest can invoke the general federal question jurisdiction
of the federal courts and bring a suit for damages. See id. at 395-96. While Bivens dealt only
with a fourth amendment right, subsequent cases have extended the constitutional cause of
action to other constitutional rights. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 242 (1979). In
Davis, the Supreme Court also added that such a damage remedy will not be available when
"special factors" are present which would counsel hesitation and concluded that a suit
against a Congressman for alleged unconstitutional violations does counsel hesitation. Id. at
245-46. A year later in Carlson v. Green the Court viewed a Bivens-type suit brought by the
administratrix of a deceased federal prisoner as involving no "special factors counseling hesitation" because the petitioner did not enjoy "such independent status in our constitutional
scheme as to suggest that judicially created remedies against them might be inappropriate."
446 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1980).
51. See Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1979), aff'd in part and
dismissed in part, 452 U.S. 713 (1981). A former National Security Council staff member
alleged that his fourth amendment rights were violated by a warrantless wiretap of his
home. See id. at 1195.
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its Framers in reaching a conclusion.s Two contentions were made in
support of the view that the President should not be treated differently
from other federal executives: (1) there is no mention of presidential immunities in the Constitution; and (2) there is evidence that the Framers
rejected the concept of presidential immunity at the Constitutional Convention.58 The first point is directly supported by the absence of a provision emulating the Speech or Debate Clause for legislators.54 In support
of the second point, however, the court relied more heavily upon circumstantial evidence.5 5 The court noted that when James Madison suggested
presidential immunities be considered, his proposal went unheeded." In
1800, Charles Pinckney explained that an immunity for the President
similar to that for legislators was not discussed because "[n]o privilege of
this kind was intended for your Executive . . . . " Other colonial statesmen, however, expressed contrary views on the subject. 8
Nixon v. Fitzgerald," represents the first time the United States Supreme Court has considered the question whether a "privilege of this
kind" is available for the President." Writing for the majority, Justice

52. See id. at 1211.
53. See id. at 1211.
54. See id. at 1211; see also Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 711 (1973) ("This silence
cannot be ascribed to oversight").
55. See Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1211 n.129 (D.C. Cir. 1979), aff'd in part
and dismissed in part, 452 U.S. 713 (1981).
56. See id. at 1211 n.129.
57. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 385 (M. Farrand ed. 1966).
58. See W. MACLAY, JOURNAL OF W. MACLAY 167 (E. Maclay ed. 1890) (Senator Ellsworth and Vice President Adams defended proposition that "the President, personally, was
not subject to any process whatever .. "),cited in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, - U.S. -, -,
102 S. Ct. 2690, 2702 n.31, 73 L. Ed. 2d 349, 364 n.31 (1982); X THE WORKS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 404 (P. Ford ed. 1905) (quoting letter from President Jefferson at Burr trial)
(Thomas Jefferson espoused idea that executive should be independent and not subject to
"commands" of judiciary), cited in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, -

U.S ....

102 S. Ct. 2690,

2702 n.31, 73 L. Ed. 2d 349, 364 n.31 (1982).
59. - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 73 L. Ed. 2d 349 (1982).
60. Id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2697, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 358. Before the Court addressed the
merits of the case, it dispensed with two challenges to its jurisdiction. First, the respondent
claimed that the Court had no jurisdiction over the district court's rejection of Nixon's immunity claim because it was not a final order. The Court held that the order denying immunity fell within a defined group of interlocutory orders which may be immediately appealed
to the court of appeals as established under the "collateral order" doctrine of Cohen v.
Beneficial Industries Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The Court held that the order here
met the "serious and unsettled question" criteria of Cohen. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, U.S. -, -, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 2698, 73 L. Ed. 2d 349, 358-59 (1982). Next, the Court held
that the parties' agreement to liquidate damages did not moot the issue because both parties were left with a large financial stake under the agreement which depended on the
Court's resolution of the case. See id. at -, 102 S.Ct. at 2699, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 360.
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Powell noted that absolute immunity for executive officials is based on
"[c]onsiderations of 'public policy and convenience.'"", Because of the
broad range and sensitive nature of the President's responsibilities," his
constant visibility," and the judicial deference he has historically been
accorded, 6 the Court concluded that civil damages suits would unduly
distract the President from his official duties.6 5 Relying on the Constitutional Convention debate on impeachment and the remarks of Justice
Story and Thomas Jefferson, the Court opined that presidential immunity was intended." Furthermore, the Court held that absolute immunity
from civil damages suits is "a functionally mandated incident of the President's unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of the separation of powers and supported by our history."6 While recognizing that
separation of powers would not consistently prevent a court's exercise of
jurisdiction over the President, 6 the Court relied on earlier Nixon cases 69
for the proposition that the interest to be served must be weighed against
the intrusion into the executive branch. 70 Because the President's actions
can affect innumerable people, the Court feared the scrutiny inherent in
civil damages suits would be overly intrusive.7 1 This same fear motivated
the majority to extend the immunity to the "outer perimeter" of his official responsibility.75 In conclusion, the Court refuted the assertion that

61. Nixon v. Fitzgerald,

-

U.S ....

102 S. Ct. 2690, 2699, 73 L. Ed. 2d 349, 360

(1982) (Court quoted Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896)).
62. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2702, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 363-64 (1982). The Court described
the President's duties as including "supervisory and policy responsibilities of the utmost
discretion and sensitivity" and divided them into three classes: (1) enforcement of the federal law; (2) conducting foreign affairs; and (3) managing the executive branch. See id. at
-'
102 S. Ct. at 2702, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 363-64.
63. See id. at -' 102 S. Ct. at 2703, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 365.
64. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2703, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 366.
65. See id. at -' 102 S. Ct. at 2703, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 365.
66. See id. at -' 102 S. Ct. at 2701-03 & n.31, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 363-65 & n.31.
67. Id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2701, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 363.
68. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2704, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 366. The Court noted that President Nixon was found amenable to a subpoena duces tecum in United States v. Nixon and
that an express order of President Truman's was enjoined in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2704, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 366; see also National Treasury
Employees' Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (court has authority to mandamus President to implement statutorily required governmental employee pay increase).
69. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald,

-

U.S.

-,

-,

102 S. Ct. 2690, 2704, 73 L. Ed. 2d 349,

366 (1982). The Court relied on Nixon v. Administrator Gen. Servs., 443 U.S. 425, 433
(1977), and United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-13 (1974). See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at
2704, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 366.
70. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2704, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 366.
71. See id. at -' 102 S. Ct. at 2703, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 365.
72. See id. at -' 102 S. Ct. at 2705, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 367. The Court noted that, frequently, earlier decisions restricted immunity to acts connected with particular functions of
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the President is "above the law" and emphasized that absolute immunity
from civil damages suits only precludes
one private remedy in order to
7
further compelling public interests. 8
Chief Justice Burger, in his concurring opinion, theorized that absolute
immunity for the President must be found in the separation of powers
doctrine, or it is non-existent.74 Agreeing with the majority, the Chief Justice concluded that the far-reaching range of the President's decisions
would lead to countless lawsuits with the inevitable result of extensively
intruding upon the executive branch.7 5 The concurrence also rebutted two
points asserted by the dissent: (1) that the President is above the law, 70
and (2) that because the President has consistently been held amenable
to judicial process, he is amenable to civil damages suits 7 In addressing
the first contention, Justice Burger reiterated the majority's point that
only civil damage suits and acts within the President's official capacity
are involved.78 As to the second argument, he concluded that the dissent
confused judicial process with civil suits, and therefore its reliance on
United States v. Nixon 79 and United States v. Burr0 was misplaced. 8 '
In his dissent, Justice White asserted that the majority placed the
President above the law82 and ignored holdings regarding judicial pro-

an office. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2705, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 367. This approach was rejected
because the Court considered it too difficult to align a particular result with one of the
President's innumerable decisions; therefore, the Court adopted the rule from Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 (1959) that acts done within the "outer perimeter" of official capacity
deserve immunity from civil damages suits and ruled that a departmental reorganization
was within this limit. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2705, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 367. The Court did
not provide a definition for the "outer perimeter" in the instant case or in Barr.
73. Id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2706, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 369. In a footnote, however, the Court
seemed to qualify its holding: "[Ojur holding today need only be that the President is absolutely immune from civil damages liability for his official acts in the absence of explicit
affirmative action by Congress." Id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2701 n.27, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 363 n.27.
74. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2707, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 370 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
75. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2708, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 371 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
76. See id. at -' 102 S. Ct. at 2709, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 372 (Burger, C.J., concurring). The
dissenters believed that the majority clothed the President with sovereign immunity and
thereby reverted to the old principle that "the King can do no wrong." Id. at -, 102 S. Ct.
at 2711, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 374 (White, J., dissenting).
77. See id. at -' 102 S. Ct. at 2707, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 370 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
78. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2707, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 370 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
79. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
80. 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d).
81. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, U.S. -,
-,
102 S. Ct. 2690, 2707, 73 L. Ed. 2d 349,
370 (1982) (Burger, C.J., concurring). Burger stressed that the "judicial process" in these
cases was a subpoena requiring production of evidence for a criminal prosecution. Id. at
102 S. Ct. at 2707, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 370 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
82. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2711, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 374 (White, J., dissenting). Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun joined in the dissent. Id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2709, 73 L.
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cess. s ' Since subjecting the President to judicial review and judicial process has not been considered intrusive,8 4 the dissent analogized that subjecting the President to civil damages claims should be no more
intrusive.8 5 The dissent's primary arguments, however, were (1) that the
traditional functional approach to immunity questions-which is defined
as attaching absolute immunity to various functions of an office, not to
the office itself-has been abandoned,8 e and (2) that the majority produced a policy decision wholly at odds with the Constitution, history, and
the law. 7 After noting that the Constitution contains no provision for
presidential immunity, 8 the dissent attacked President Nixon's colonial
history evidence.89 In so doing, however, the dissent did not proclaim that
history mandates the President be subject to civil liablity, but only that it
does not demand he should be immune.' The majority decision was

Ed. 2d at 372 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun also wrote a dissent in which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined and concluded that in light of the parties' settlement
agreement, certiorari should have been denied. See id. at -, 102 S.Ct. at 2726-27, 73 L. Ed.
2d at 394-95 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
83. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2718, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 383-84 (White, J., dissenting).
84. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2718, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 383-84 (White, J., dissenting). The
dissenters noted that the President has been subject to the injunctive powers of the courts
and has been held amenable to subpoenas duces tecum in criminal proceedings. See id. at
102 S. Ct. at 2718, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 383-84 (White, J., dissenting).
85. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2718, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 384 (White, J., dissenting).
86. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2720, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 385 (White, J., dissenting).
87. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2712, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 376 (White, J., dissenting.
88. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2713, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 377 (White, J., dissenting).
89. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2713, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 377 (White, J., dissenting). Nixon
relied on the following three items: (1) preratification remarks at the Constitutional Convention during the presidential impeachment debate and in The Federalist;(2) remarks made
at the First Senate Meeting; and (3) Justice Story's Commentaries.The dissent refuted the
majority's conclusion that impeachment was to be the only means of punishing the President and noted that the convention debate focused on potential wrongs against the state,
not against individuals. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2713-14, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 377-78 (White,
J., dissenting). Similarly, the dissent noted that Hamilton was also concerned with wrongs
against the state in The Federalist and that opposing views of other statesmen nullified any
support to be found in them. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2714-15, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 378-79
(White, J., dissenting). The dissent also pointed out that there were contrasting opinions
expressed at the First Senate Meeting regarding the President's amenability. Finally, the
dissent discounted the views of Justice Story by stressing that they came 46 years after the
convention and by comparing them to the contrary views of convention delegate Senator
Pinckney. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2715-16, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 380-81 (White, J., dissenting).
90. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2714 n.13, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 378 n.13 (White, J., dissenting). The dissenters concluded that "nothing in the debates suggests an expectation that the
President would not be liable in civil suits for damages ....
Id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2714
n.13, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 378 n.13 (White, J., dissenting). According to them, the State Ratifying
Convention reveals only that the President's accountability to judicial process "was no
clearer then than it is now." Id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2715, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 380 (White, J.,
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viewed as being at odds with the law not only because it ignored the functional approach 1 but also because it caused congressional statutes to be
circumvented.2 Finally, in assessing and attacking what they perceived to
be the majority's three main points, the dissenters concluded the following: that the President's unique role does not justify a unique rule of liability; 98 that although he may be particularly visible and vulnerable to
civil suits, summary judgment procedures would sufficiently protect the
President; 4 and that even if it is assumed that the President will be distracted by law suits, legal accountability justifies this cost."
Not content to base its argument solely on the separation of powers,
the majority also urged public policy" and historical arguments.' 7 Indeed,
it is these two premises which merited the most vigorous retorts from the
dissent."s Justice Burger, on the other hand, essentially limited his opin-

dissenting). Further, the dissenters believed that nothing in history suggests that the President should be immune. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2717, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 382 (White, J.,
dissenting).
91. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2720, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 385 (White, J., dissenting).
92. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2720-21, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 386-87 (White, J., dissenting).
The dissent concluded that the two statutes under which Fitzgerald stated a cause of action
were designed to provide Congress with access to information in the possession of the executive branch and that allowing the President to avoid these actions "assumes that presidential functions are to be valued over congressional functions." Id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2721,
73 L. Ed. 2d at 387 (White, J., dissenting).
93. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2725,73 L. Ed. 2d at 392 (White, J., dissenting).
94. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2725, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 392-93 (White, J., dissenting). The
dissent also said a fear of subjecting the President to a multitude of civil suits was unwarranted since historically the President has not been the subject of innumerable suits, and
even though a Bivens-type action has only been available since 1971, there have not been
many actions filed under it. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2725, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 393 (White, J.,
dissenting). But see Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 526 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist pointed out that from 1961 to 1977 the number of cases brought under
the civil rights statutes, which provide citizens with a cause of action against federal officials, increased from 296 to 13,113; furthermore, he feared a similar pattern would be repeated in respect to the President if the path were cleared. See id. at 526 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
95. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald,

-

U.S ....

102 S. Ct. 2690, 2726, 73 L. Ed. 2d 349,

393 (1982) (White, J., dissenting).
96. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2699-700, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 360-61. The majority emphasized that the public interest often requires a grant of immunity to public officers as this
will insure that officials act without fear of retribution. The majority also determined that
because of the President's unique visibility he would be especially distracted by the constant threat of law suits which would be a detriment to both the presidency and the nation.
Id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2699-700, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 360-61.
97. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2701-03 & n.31, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 364-65 & n.31.
98. See id. at .,102
S. Ct. at 2712-17, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 378-82 (White, J., dissenting).
The dissenters opined that the majority decision is "policy, not law" and "very poor policy."
Id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2712, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 376 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent also
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ion to the separation of powers issue."' Thus, the concurring opinion
avoided a confusing corollary 00 and the detracting weaknesses in the majority's argument, and thereby produced a sounder disposition of the is-

sue. The weakest link in the majority's line of reasoning, which is avoided
by the concurrence, is the historical evidence. 0 1 A quote from Justice
Story is the only example which the majority did not relegate to footnote
status.0 2 While Justice Story expressly stated that the President "must
be deemed, in civil cases at least, to possess an official inviolability, 10
the text was written in 1833 in his commentaries rather than in a Supreme Court opinion.' " It can, therefore, hardly be considered precedent

as to the Framers' intent. The majority also relied on the impeachment
debate at the Constitutional Convention and the remarks of Thomas Jefferson.105 Because the dissent ably attacked these indicia and presented
contrary opinions of other prominent colonial statesmen,1 0 6 the only de-

duction which can be made from all of the historical evidence is that

devoted several paragraphs to attacking and countering the majority's historical offerings.
See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2713-17, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 378-82 (White, J., dissenting).
99. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2706, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 369 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
100. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2701 n.27, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 363 n.27. The confusing
suggestion the majority added is in a footnote wherein it is intimated that Congress could
alter the holding. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2701 n.27, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 363 n.27. Justice
Burger, also in a footnote, decreed that the opinion should be read as precluding legislative
alteration. See id. at -, 102 S.Ct. at 2709 n.7, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 372 n.7 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring).
101. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2702-03 n.31, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 364-65 n.31.
102. See id. at -, 102 S.Ct. at 2701, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 363.
103. Id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2701-02, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 363 (quoting J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1563, at 418-19 (1833)).
104. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2715, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 380 (White, J., dissenting). The
dissent emphasized the date of Justice Story's comments and then countered with the opposite views of Senator Pinckney, who argued it was a deliberate choice of the delegates at the
Constitutional Convention not to extend civil suit immunity to the President. See id. at -,
102 S.Ct. at 2716, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 381 (White, J., dissenting).
105. See id. at -, 102 S.Ct. at 2702 n.31, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 364 n.31. Relying on Jefferson's words that the executive should not be subject to the commands of the judiciary in
any form, the majority noted that several Constitutional Convention delegates were fearful
that even impeachment would too greatly impair the function of the President's office. See
id. at -, 102 S.Ct. at 2702 n.31, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 364 n.31.
106. See id. at -, 102 S.Ct. at 2713-15, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 377-79 (White, J., dissenting).
The dissent contended that the immunity debate is irrelevant because it focused on presidential wrongs against the state, not individuals. See id. at -, 102 S.Ct. at 2713-14, 73 L.
Ed. 2d at 378 (White, J., dissenting). It also presented the views of Governor Johnson of
North Carolina, James Wilson, and Senator Maclay. See id. at -, 102 S.Ct. at 2714-15, 73
L. Ed. 2d at 379-80 (White, J., dissenting). Additionally, the dissenters demonstrate their
refusal to accept the opinion of any one of these early statesmen: "There is no more reason
to respect the views of Hamilton than those of Wilson." Id. at -, 102 S.Ct. at 2715, 73 L.
Ed. 2d at 379 (White, J., dissenting).
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there were many diversified opinions, none of which were given express
support in the Constitution. 0 7
The dissent was quick to point out that because there is an express
provision in the Constitution for legislators one would have been provided
for the President if one had been intended. 0 8 As the majority rebutted,'"9
however, there is not an express provision for judges, prosecutors, state
legislators, or legislative aides, yet all of these officials have been extended absolute immunity.1"' Turning to the separation of powers, the
dissent relied on the "presidential privilege" cases' as precluding any

107. Compare W. MACLAY, JOURNAL OF W. MACLAY 167 (E. Maclay ed. 1890) (Senator
Ellsworth and Vice President Adams defended proposition that "the President, personally,
was not subject to any process whatever. . . ."), cited in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, - U.S. -,
-, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2702 n.31, 73 L. Ed. 2d 349, 364 n.31 (1982) with 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES
ON THE FEDERAL CONS TUTION 480 (James Wilson proclaimed at Pennsylvania ratifying
convention that President amenable to civil process), cited in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, - U.S.
-,
-,
102 S. Ct. 2690, 2715, 73 L. Ed. 2d 349, 379 (1982) (White, J., dissenting). It is
significant that while it was suggested that presidential immunity should be discussed, the
subject was not debated at the convention itself. See Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192,
1211 n.129 aff'd in part and dismissed in part, 452 U.S. 713 (1981); 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 503 (M. Farrand ed. 1911). In 1800, however, Senator
Pinckney, who had been at the convention, explained that there was no discussion because
no privilege was intended. See 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CoNvENnoN OF 1787, at 385
(M. Farrand ed. 1911). Despite Pinckney's words, the Supreme Court has long recognized
that the President should be accorded strict judicial restraint. See Kendall v. United States,
37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 610 (1838) ("The executive power is vested in a President; and as far
as his powers are derived from the constitution, he is beyond the reach of any other department, except in the mode prescribed by the constitution through the impeaching power.");
see also Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 501 (1866) (Court had no jurisdiction
to enjoin President in official acts); Schwartz, Bad PresidentsMake Hard Law: Richard M.
Nixon In The Supreme Court, 31 RTrrGRs L. REv. 22, 26 (1978) (Mississippi v. Johnson
never overruled and is therefore formal bar to suits with President as defendant).
108. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, - U.S ....
102 S. Ct. 2690, 2713, 73 L. Ed. 2d 349,
377 (1982) (White, J., dissenting).
109. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2702 n.31, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 364 n.31.
110. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422-23 (1976) (prosecutors); Gravel v.
United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616 (1972) (legislative aides); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S.
367, 377 (1951) (state legislators); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 200-05 (1880) (federal legislators); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351-52 (1871) (judges).
111. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-13 (1974); United States v. Burr, 25 F.
Cas. 30, 34 (C.C. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d). The difference between a privilege and an immunity should be noted. Prosser states that a privilege avoids tort liability under "particular
circumstances" while an immunity avoids liability "under all circumstances within the immunity itself; it is conferred, not because of the particular facts, but because of the status or
position of the favored defendant; and it does not deny the tort, but the resulting liability."
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 970 (4th ed. 1971). Former Supreme Court
Justice Abe Fortas summarized executive privilege as "the principle that, in limited situations, the courts will permit the President or a principal executive officer to decline to comply with subpoenas or congressional demands . . . ." Fortas, The Constitution and the
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assertion that civil suit amenability violates that principle."" This reli-

ance, however, is misplaced. The holdings of United States v. Burr and
United States v. Nixon were that a President was subject to subpoenas
duces tecum in specific criminal matters." 8 Amenability to subpoenas,
however, does not presuppose amenability to civil suits." ' United States
v. Nixon"8 did expressly state that separation of powers was not violated," but the holding of that case has been considered extremely narrow. 7 Thus, the dissent's conclusion, that since subjecting a President to
a subpoena duces tecum did not violate the separation of powers then
neither does subjecting him to civil damages liability, is fallacious." 8
While the holding of United States v. Nixon" 9 is not dispositive of
Nixon v. Fitzgerald,120 it does contain the Supreme Court's most recent
approach to separation of powers questions. This approach involves balancing the competing claims of the coordinate branches of the government to determine whether the constitutional functions of one branch
have been invaded by acts of another branch."2 ' In United States v.
Nixon the Court applied this balancing test by first recognizing that the

Presidency,49 WASH. L. REv. 987, 998 (1974). Presidential privilege and immunity are similar in that neither is expressly supported by the Constitution; instead, both are said to arise
from enumerated powers and the status of the office. Compare Nixon v. Fitzgerald, U.S.
-,
-,
102 S. Ct. 2690, 2701, 73 L. Ed. 2d 349, 363 (1982) (immunity is a "functionally
mandated incident of the President's unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of
the separation of powers . . . .") with United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974)
(privilege flows from enumerated powers and need to protect the confidentiality of President's communications).
112. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, U.S ....
102 S. Ct. 2690, 2717-18, 73 L. Ed. 2d
349, 383-84 (1982) (White, J., dissenting).
113. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974); United States v. Burr, 25 F.
Cas. 30, 34 (C.C. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d).
114. See Note, Presidential Immunity from Constitutional Damage Liability, 60
B.U.L. REv. 879, 902 (1980).
115. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
116. See id. at 706-07.
117. See, e.g., Karst & Horowitz, Presidential Prerogative And Judicial Review, 22
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 47, 66 (1974) (holding narrow and unlikely to be repeated as circumstances
unique); Schwartz, Bad Presidents Make Hard Law: Richard M. Nixon In The Supreme
Court, 31 RuTGws L. REv. 22, 23 (1978) (holding will rarely be applied again without comparable facts); Van Alstyne, A Political And Constitutional Review Of United States v.
Nixon, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 116, 117 (1974) (opinion "exceptionally restrained" and holding
narrow).
118. Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974) (holding limited to President's
amenability to subpoena duces tecum in "pending criminal trial").
119. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
120. U.S. -,
102 S. Ct. 2690, 73 L. Ed. 2d 349 (1982).
121. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711-12 (1974). This balancing approach
was also used in Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).
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judiciary and the executive were asserting equal yet competing claims: the
judiciary's need for evidence to insure justice in a pending criminal trial
and the President's interest in confidentiality. 122 The Court then determined to what degree the claim of one branch would impede the function
of the other. 12 s Because President Nixon asserted only a general need for
confidentiality and the judiciary demonstrated a "specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial," it was concluded that the President's
claim would intrude too deeply into the judiciary's function. 124 In arriving
at this conclusion, the Court deemed it significant that intrusion into the
executive branch would be minimal since the President and his advisors
would not "be moved to temper the candor of their remarks by the infrequent occasions of disclosure ....,,125
When the foregoing analysis is applied to the case at hand, a separation
of powers problem emerges. The competing claims are a President's need
to insure uninhibited decision making and to be free from distracting law
suits' s6 versus the judiciary's responsibility for vindicating alleged violations of individuals' rights.12 7 In this case the judiciary's claim is as generalized as the President's because more than one "pending" trial is in-

122. See Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies,

30 STAN. L. Rzv. 661, 669 (1978).
123. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974); see also Nagel, Separation
of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REv. 661, 668 (1978).
124. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974).
125. Id. at 712.
126. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959). In discussing the disadvantages in

subjecting public officials to civil damages liability, the Court noted the following:
It has been thought important that officials of government should be free to exercise

their duties unembarrassed by the fear of damage suits in respect of acts done in the
course of those duties-suits which would consume time and energies which would
otherwise be devoted to governmental service and the threat of which might appreci-

ably inhibit the fearless, vigorous, and effective administration of policies of
government.

Id. at 571; see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974) (in public interest for
President to feel free to express candid opinions in decision-making process); Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974) (recognized that immunity deters fear that amenability to
lawsuits will cause officials to lack "decisiveness and the judgment required by the public
good"); Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1213 n.144 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (immunity given to

legislators to spare them "cost and inconvenience and distractions" of trials), aff'd in part
and dismissed in part, 452 U.S. 713 (1981); Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396, 404 (2d Cir. 1926)

(public interest dictates that persons occupying "important positions ... should speak and
act freely and fearlessly in the discharge of their important official functions"), aff'd per
curiam, 275 U.S. 503 (1927).
127. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241 (1979) (judiciary is primary means by

which rights enforced); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971) (traditional rule that courts provide remedies when constitutional
rights invaded).
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volved.'" s Whereas in United States v. Nixon the court's ability to
adjudicate the specific trial at issue would have been seriously impaired
by a claim of presidential privilege,' here the judiciary's function will
not be overwhelmingly impeded by according the President absolute immunity. On the contrary, courts will still be able to provide citizens with
remedies: first, the President rarely acts alone and, therefore, other defendants could be joined;130 second, statutory remedies may be available
as they were for Fitzgerald.18 ' The executive's function, however, will be
seriously impeded without immunity. Because of the countless and farreaching decisions a President makes daily, countless people could consider themselves aggrieved and bring suit. Consequently, the intricacies of
the executive decision making would be scrutinized countless times.8 2
Unlike the case in United States v. Nixon, the intrusion would be fre-

quent and the tendency to "temper the candor" of remarks would be increased manifold.1' s In Nixon v. Fitzgerald the results of the balancing
test affirmatively demonstrate that a separation of powers violation will
exist unless the President is accorded absolute immunity from civil dam-

ages suits.
The dissenters declared that separation of powers does not warrant discarding the functional approach which determines the extent of immunity
by confining it to certain functions of an office.'" This approach, however, has not been abandoned. Viewing the functional approach as inadequate for the broad variety of the President's discretionary responsibili-

128. Compare United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974) (evidence needed for
U.S. -,
-,
102 S. Ct. 2690, 2701,
one pending criminal trial) with Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 73 L. Ed. 2d 349, 362 (1982) (decided whether President should be subject to all civil damages suits brought against him).
129. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974).
U.S. -,
-,
102 S. Ct. 2690, 2696, 73 L. Ed. 2d
130. See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 349, 357 (1982) (Fitzgerald originally named eight officials as defendants); Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Halperin sued ten federal officials including
President Nixon), af'd in part and dismissed in part, 452 U.S. 713 (1981); Clark v. United
States, 481 F. Supp. 1086, 1096-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (Clark sued ten federal officials including
President), cross appeal stayed, 624 F.2d 3 (1980).
U.S. -,
-,
102 S. Ct. 2690, 2696 n.15, 73 L. Ed. 2d
131. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 349, 356 n.15 (1982). The position Fitzgerald held in the Air Force was in the excepted
service; therefore, he was not entitled to the protection of civil service rules and regulations.
He was, however, accorded statutory protections under the Veterans Preference Act. See id.
at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2696 n.15, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 356 n.15.
132. See Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Gesell, J., concurring), af'd in part and dismissed in part, 452 U.S. 713 (1981).
133. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 712 (1974).
-,
-,
102 S. Ct. 2690, 2720, 2725, 73 L.
134. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, U.S. -,
Ed. 2d 349, 386, 392 (1982) (White, J., dissenting).
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ties,s 5 the majority simply applied the same scope of immunity used in
other absolute immunity cases.'83 The dissenters also concluded that applying qualified immunity to the President would prevent intensive intrustion into the office and thereby satisfy the dictates of separation of
powers. 37 They based this conclusion on their belief that summary judgment procedures would protect the President from defending frivolous
suits.' 8 Because qualified immunity involves a subjective and objective
standard, 8 9 however, summary judgment procedures would hinder, rather
than protect, the President. The subjective standard will obviously require delving into the President's state of mind to ascertain intent-an
exercise which generally precludes a summary judgment.' 40 The objective
standard involves determining whether the President knew or should
have known he was violating a constitutional right.14 1 Making this deter-

135. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2705, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 367. One of the major qualified
immunity cases even recognized that an office with broad discretion and complex responsibilities may be granted far-ranging immunity. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48
(1974) (scope of immunity will vary depending on discretion and functions of office). Who
has greater responsibiity than the President? See Fortas, The Constitution And The Presidency, 49 WASH. L. REV. 987, 987 (1974) ("The President's finger can put vast events in
motion-not just the firing of the nuclear bomb").
136. See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (judges immune even
when act is "in excess of [their] authority" as long as not total absence of jurisdiction); Barr
v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 (1959) (executive officials have absolute immunity when acting
within "the outer perimeter" of authority); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896) (immunity extends to acts of executive "having more or less connection with the general matters committed by law to his control").
137. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald,

-

U.S ....

102 S. Ct. 2690, 2719-20, 73 L. Ed. 2d

349, 385-86 (1982) (White, J., dissenting).
138. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2725, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 393 (White, J., dissenting); see
also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508 (1978).
139. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 318 (1975); Note, PresidentialImmunity
from ConstitutionalDamages Liability, 60 B.U.L. REv. 879, 887 (1980).
140. See, e.g., Poller v. CBS, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962) (when intent and motive
play leading role, summary judgment should rarely be used); Croley v. Matson Navigation
Co., 434 F.2d 73, 77 (5th Cir. 1970) (when dispositive issue requires determination of state
of mind, courts should be cautious in granting summary judgment); Alles Corp. v. Senco
Prods., Inc., 329 F.2d 567, 572 (6th Cir. 1964) (questions of intent generally preclude summary judgment). "Inasmuch as a determination of someone's state of mind usually entails
the drawing of factual inferences as to which reasonable men might differ . . ." summary
judgment is often inappropriate. 10A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 2730, at 238 (1983).
141. See, e.g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 562 (1978) (prison administrators
not entitled to absolute immunity if knew or should have known prisoner's constitutional
rights infringed); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 577 (1975) (question for jury
whether hospital superintendant knew or should have known he violated mental patient's
rights); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975) (school board member not immune if
knew or should have known student's constitutional rights violated).
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mination would require reconstructing the entire factual surroundings in

which the action was taken.14 Again, such factual determinations would
inevitably require a trial on the merits.14 In any event, it is not difficult
for an attorney to "create4 a material issue of fact" which would require a
4
1

full trial on the merits.
Summary judgment proceedings would not protect the presidential of-

fice from the scrutiny and distractions which offend the constitutional
principle of separation of powers. Only absolute immunity will provide

that protection. The Supreme Court has determined that absolute immunity would be appropriate for an office which maintains a certain "independent status" in our government. 45 What office in the United States,
and indeed in the world, is as powerful and prestigious as the presidency?
That absolute immunity has placed the President above the law is a misconception for he still may be subject to impeachment,' 4" and to mandamus, injunctions, and subpoena duces tecum in criminal trials,147 as well
142. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 239 (1974) (official's liability depends on all
circumstances as revealed by evidence). In order for a determination to be made regarding
what the President knew or should have known, details of the executive office would need to
be exposed. Cf. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 157 (4th ed. 1971):
Knowledge ... rests upon [the] perception of the actor's surroundings, memory of
what has gone before, and a power to correlate the two with previous experience. So
far as perception is concerned,. . . the actor must give to his surroundings the attention which a standard reasonable man would consider necessary under the circumstances ....

Id. at 157.
143. See, e.g., Poller v. CBS, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 467 (1962) (summary judgment should
not be granted unless truth clear); S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. Ohio Turnpike Comm'n, 315
F.2d 235, 237-38 (6th Cir.) (when parties may in good faith disagree about inferences to be
drawn from facts, summary judgment not proper), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 824 (1963); Jack
Winter Inc. v. Koratron Co., 327 F. Supp. 206, 210 (N.D. Ca. 1971) ("One often gains valuable insight from the total facts which cannot be acquired from a microscopic approach
which obtains on a summary judgment...").
144. Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Gesell, J., concurring),
aff'd in part and dismissed in part, 452 U.S. 713 (1981). The concurring justice noted that
"a sentence from a casual document or a difference in recollection with regard to a particular policy conversation held long ago would usually" require a full trial on the merits. Id. at
1214 (Gesell, J., concurring).
145. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 16-19 (1980); see also Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232, 247 (1974) (Court stated more immunity appropriate with offices with greater
responsibilities).
146. U.S. CONsT. art. II,

§

4.

147. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974) (President subject to
subpoena duces tecum in criminal trial); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 584, 589 (1952) (Secretary of Commerce enjoined from executing direct presidential
order); National Treasury Employees' Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(President subject to mandamus to implement statutorily required governmental employee
pay increase).
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as being amenable to civil suits when acting beyond the outer perimeter
of his official capacity. Moreover, the President, more than any other
public official, is subject to the criticisms of a demanding public analyzing
his every move. It may be true that over the decades a very small number
of individuals with meritorious claims will be precluded from recovering
from one possible defendant;1 4 8 yet that cost is required by the principle
of separation of powers and is imperative to maintain the effective operation of our government.
Laura H. Burney

148. See Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949
(1950). In that case, Judge Learned Hand explained that:
The justification for [denying recovery] is that it is impossible to know whether the
claim is well-founded until the case has been tried, and that to submit all officials, the
innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of
its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties.
Id. at 581.

